In Payne v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2008 WL 4890760, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Norfolk Division) entertained a case of first impression, applying the collateral source rule to damages discharged through Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings and the use of medical bills in proving pain and suffering.
In Payne, the Plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision with an agent of the Defendant, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., sustaining serious personal injuries that necessitated continued medical treatment. Approximately 10 months after the incident, the Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and listed his medical bills within his lists of assets and debts. The Court discharged his debts on or about April 7, 2008.
The Plaintiff sought to introduce his medical bills and the Defendant moved, in limine, to exclude. The Defendant argued that the bills were barred as they were previously discharged through bankruptcy proceedings barring their introduction for special damages and could not be used to prove pain and suffering due to lack of relevance.
While the Plaintiff argued that a bankruptcy proceeding functioned in place of other third parties, like insurance or workers’ compensation, the Court was not moved by such argument. To the contrary, the Court determined that ruling in the Plaintiff’s favor could ultimately cut against the public policy interests of the collateral source rule. In particular, the Court noted that the purpose of the rule is to encourage such third-party safety nets as insurance and workers’ compensation. The Court noted, to contrast, that bankruptcy is not an action to be encouraged or taken lightly. Particularly, the Court determined that “Pre-petition debts that are not fraudulently incurred, whether listed in the schedules or not, are discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § Section 727(holding the same for Chapter 7 no-asset cases),” and, consistent thereto, all of the Plaintiff’s pre-bankruptcy amended petition medical bills, whether listed or not listed, were excluded from evidence to prove special damages.
In addition, and perhaps more crucial to the future of personal injury litigation, the Court denied the admissibility of the same medical bills for the singular purpose of proving pain and suffering. In doing so, the Court concluded that
“It is immediately apparent that there is no logical or experiential correlation between the monetary value of medical services required to treat a given injury and the quantum of pain and suffering endured as a result of that injury. First, the mere dollar amount assigned to medical services masks the difference in severity between various types of injuries. A very painful injury may be untreatable, or, on the other hand, may require simpler and less costly treatment than a less painful one. The same disparity in treatment may exist between different but equally painful injuries. Second, given identical injuries, the method or extent of treatment sought by the patient or prescribed by the physician may vary from patient to patient and from physician to physician. Third, even where injury and treatment are identical, the reasonable value of that treatment may vary considerably depending upon the medical facility and community in which care is provided and the rates of physicians and other health care personnel involved. Finally, even given identical injuries, treatment and cost, the fact remains that pain is subjective and varies from individual to individual.”
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